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EVIDENCE
I. THE ADmissEBILITY OF EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES FOR THE
PURPOSE OF ATTACKING THE CREDIBILrry OF A WITNESS
Although "[e]vidence of other crimes is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith,"" it may be used for the purpose of im-
peachment.2 Initially, South Carolina courts admitted, for im-
peachment purposes, only evidence of "a conviction of a felony
for the crimen falsi,"8 which, at common law, included such of-
fenses as forgery, perjury, and subornation of perjury. This
standard evolved to allow evidence of impeaching crimes of
"moral delinquency" 5 that are "not too remote." "Moral delin-
1. E.g., State v. Lyle, 125 S.C. 406, 118 S.E.2d 803 (1925). See C. MCCORMICK, MC-
CORMIcK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 188 (2d ed. 1972). Character evidence
may be circumstantially relevant to suggest that a person with a particular propensity or
trait acted in conformity with that trait on the occasion in question. While the use of
character in this way has unquestionable probative value and relevance, its use is gener-
ally proscribed. Id.; see 1 J. WIsooRz, TreaISE ON EvIDENcE, §§ 52, 57 (3d ed. 1940).
The policy of exclusion is premised on the belief that cases should not be decided on
facts other than those directly relevant to the immediate suit. Udall, Character Proof in
the Law of Evidence-A Summary, 18 U. CN. L. Ray. 283, 296-97 (1949). Justice Car-
dozo summarized the bias against such evidence in terms of an awareness of "peril to the
innocent if character is accepted as probative of crime." People v. Zackowitz, 254 N.Y.
192, 194, 172 N.E. 466, 468 (1930). In essence, although character evidence may be pro-
bative and relevant, it is excluded because it unduly prejudices the party against whom
it is used. 1 J. WIGMORE, supra § 29a at 412. See also id. at §§ 1171, 1906.
2. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gould, 266 S.C. 521, 224 S.E.2d 715 (1976). See
generally 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, §§ 926, 987. Evidence of other crimes may also
be admissible for certain substantive purposes. 125 S.C. at 416, 118 S.E. at 807.
3. Anonymous, 19 S.C.L. (1 Hill) 251, 257 (1833).
4. BLACK'S LAw DicnONARY 335 (5th ed. 1979).
5. Gantt v. Columbia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 204 S.C. 374, 379, 29 S.E.2d 488, 489-
90 (1944).
6. Id. South Carolina apparently has no clear cut standard for remoteness in time.
The courts usually follow the general rule disallowing admission when the conviction is
more than ten years old. See State v. Hill, 268 S.C. 390, 234 S.E.2d 219 (1977) (1966
conviction of tampering with an automobile was not admissible because of remoteness in
1977 prosecution). FED. R. Evm. 609(b) provides that-
[e]vidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more
than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of
the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the
later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the pro-
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quency" has since been characterized as "moral turpitude. '7 In
State v. LaBarge," the South Carolina Supreme Court reaffirmed
the standard of moral turpitude and rejected a proposed alter-
nate standard of "social irresponsibility."" In State v. Bailey,10
the court ruled that the trial court may determine whether an
impeaching crime is one of moral turpitude by examining its le-
gal definition and, in certain circumstances, the particulars of
the indictment.1"
In LaBarge, defendant was charged with murder and armed
robbery. At trial, the victim's daughter, who had previously ad-
mitted participation in the crimes and pleaded guilty, served as
the prosecution's chief witness. Defendant sought to impeach
this witness' credibility by admitting evidence of her prior con-
victions, asserting that the evidence was admissible because the
crimes constituted acts of social irresponsibility.12 The trial
court refused to admit the evidence, and defendant was con-
victed. He appealed the convictions on several grounds, includ-
ing the trial court's refusal to admit the impeaching evidence.
The supreme court reversed the conviction on other grounds but
reaffirmed the established moral turpitude standard, setting
forth the traditional definition of moral turpitude as "an act of
baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties
which a man owes to his fellow man, or society in general, con-
trary to the accepted and customary right and duty between
man and man."13 The court then explained that, although all
crimes indicate some degree of social irresponsibility, not every
crime is one of moral turpitude. Further, the court expressly re-
bative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances
substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However, evidence of a conviction
more than 10 years old as calculated herein, is not admissible unless the propo-
nent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written notice of intent to
use such evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to con-
test the use of such evidence.
While the South Carolina rule appears to follow the time frame of the federal rule, like
that rule, it is subject to exception.
7. State v. Horton, 271 S.C. 413, 248 S.E.2d 263 (1978).
8. - S.C. -, 268 S.E.2d 278 (1980).
9. Id. at -, 268 S.E.2d at 280.
10. - S.C. -, 272 S.E.2d 439 (1980).
11. Id. at -, 272 S.E.2d at 440.
12. See Brief for Appellant at 33; Record, vol. 1, at 121.
13. - S.C. at , 268 S.E.2d at 280 (quoting State v. Horton, 271 S.C. 413, 414,
248 S.E.2d 263, 263 (1978) (citing 58 C.J.S. Moral 1201 (1948)).
[Vol. 33
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jected defendant's assertion that public drunkenness, breach of
peace, disorderly conduct, driving without a license, and tres-
passing are crimes of moral turpitude."
In Bailey, defendant was charged with disturbing a school
and assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature. At
trial, the prosecution sought to impeach defendant by offering
evidence of a prior conviction of assault and battery of a high
and aggravated nature. The trial court ruled the evidence admis-
sible, and defendant was convicted. 15 Defendant appealed, and
the supreme court reversed his conviction, stating that, because
the impeaching crime is not invariably one of moral turpitude,
the nature of the crime could be determined from the particu-
lars of the indictment. The indictment for defendant's prior con-
viction, however, had not been available for review by the trial
court, and the supreme court therefore remanded the case for a
new trial. 6
Although the South Carolina Supreme Court has adopted a
definition of moral turpitude,'17 it has failed to develop clear
guidelines for the application of the definition. 8 Consequently, a
14. Id. at - 268 S.E.2d at 280.
15. Record at 60-62, 106-07.
16. - S.C. at -, 272 S.E.2d at 440 (citing United States ex rel. Zaffarano v. Corsi,
63 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1933) (a decision determining whether moral turpitude was inherent
in second-degree assault)).
17. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
18. Evidence admitted by the South Carolina courts for impeachment purposes in-
cludes evidence of convictions for housebreaking, State v. Van Williams, 212 S.C. 110, 46
S.E.2d 665 (1948); auto theft and receiving stolen goods, State v. Millings, 247 S.C. 18,
145 S.E.2d 422 (1965); larceny, State v. Reggen, 214 S.C. 370, 52 S.E.2d 708 (1949); hit
and run, State v. Horton, 271 S.C. 413, 248 S.E.2d 263 (1978); and forgery, State v. John-
son, 271 S.C. 485, 248 S.E.2d 313 (1978). Courts have disallowed evidence of crimes of
manslaughter, Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gould, 266 S.C. 521, 224 S.E.2d 715 (1976); pos-
session of an unlawful weapon and escape, Taylor v. State, 258 S.C. 369, 188 S.E.2d 859
(1972); possession of drugs without a prescription, State v. Carriker, 269 S.C. 553, 238
S.E.2d 678 (1977); simple possession of marijuana, State v. Harvey, - S.C. , 268
S.E.2d 587 (1980); and public drunkenness, breach of peace, disorderly conduct, driving
without a license, and trespassing, State v. LaBarge, - S.C. -, 268 S.E.2d 278 (1980).
A simple rendition of what has and has not been admitted does little to establish a
conceptual basis for the rule.
In Tennessee, where the standard and definition of moral turpitude is the same as in
South Carolina, a similar pattern of confusion persists. Apparently, the state courts have
been unable to apply the definition of moral turpitude to specific acts of criminal con-
duct. Although one Tennessee court has ruled that a conviction for driving while intoxi-
cated does not constitute moral turpitude, Fee v. State, 497 S.W.2d 748 (Tenn. 1973),
another has held that driving without a license and drunken driving are crimes of moral
3
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trial court considering the admissibility of a prior crime for the
purpose of impeachment may have difficulty determining
whether the crime falls within the moral turpitude standard that
the supreme court reaffirmed in LaBarge. In Bailey, the court
again failed to formulate a clear test for determining whether a
crime is one of moral turpitude, explaining instead that a trial
court must examine "the inherent nature of the crime."1 Be-
cause the court stated that the inherent nature of a crime is "de-
fined by law," a trial court presumably must rely on earlier deci-
sions for guidance. 20 When the impeaching crime is not
invariably one of moral turpitude, a trial court also may review
the indictment in a prior conviction for facts providing insight
into the nature of the crime.21 A trial court's inquiry, however,
may not proceed beyond examination of the impeaching crime's
"defin[ition] by law and [its] particulariz[ation] by the indict-
ment," lest an "extensive hearing on collateral matters" ensue.22
The results of such a case by case determination are unpre-
dictable, at best, as recognized by Acting Associate Justice Cox
in his dissent to State v. Harvey.23 Justice Cox expressly called
for abrogation of the moral turpitude rule in favor of an ap-
proach consistent with that of the Federal Rules of Evidence.2'
Federal Rule 60925 sets forth two standards pursuant to which
turpitude, Davis v. Wicker, 206 Tenn. 403, 333 S.W.2d 921 (1960). Similarly, violating
liquor laws has been held a crime of moral turpitude, Everhart v. State, 197 Tenn. 272,
250 S.W.2d 368 (1952), but bootlegging has not, Gray v. State, 191 Tenn. 526, 235
S.W.2d 20 (1950). A conviction for public drunkenness and malicious mischief was
deemed admissible in one case, Thomas v. State, 465 S.W.2d 887 (Tenn. 1970), but in
another case public drunkenness was found not to constitute moral turpitude and was
not admitted for impeachment purposes, Bolin v. State, 472 S.W.2d 232 (Tenn. 1971).
19. - S.C. at -, 272 S.E.2d at 440.
20. See note 18 supra.
21. - S.C. at -, 272 S.E.2d at 440.
22. Id. at -, 272 S.E.2d at 440.
23. - S.C. , 268 S.E.2d 587 (1980).
24. Id. at --., 268 S.E.2d at 589.
25. FED. R. Evm. 609(a) provides:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he
has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or estab-
lished by public record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law
under which he was convicted, and the court determines that the probative
value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defen-
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evidence of a prior crime may be admitted for purposes of im-
peachment. First, the rule provides for the admissibility of a
conviction of any prior crime statutorily "punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year [upon the court's determina-
tion] that the probative value of admitting this evidence out-
weighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant. '26 Second, the rule
provides for admissibility of evidence of a conviction of any
prior crime "involv[ing] dishonesty or false statement, regardless
of the punishment. 27 Under either standard, evidence is admis-
sible for ten years from the date of the conviction or release
from confinement, whichever is later. The trial court, however,
has discretion, in certain circumstances, to exceed the ten year
limitation if practical considerations of relevancy and fairness so
require. 28 The South Carolina Supreme Court should give seri-
ous consideration to adopting this approach; it would reduce
substantially the ambiguity surrounding the present moral tur-
pitude standard and would provide a more objective test for de-
termining the admissibility of prior crimes for the purpose of
impeachment.
II. HEARSAY: THE ADMISSmLITY OF PRIOR CONSISTENT
STATEMENTS
The traditional interpretation of the hearsay rule in South
Carolina and the majority of other American jurisdictions has
excluded evidence of a witness' prior consistent statement when
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.2' In State v.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. FED. R. Evm. 609(b) provides:
Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of
more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the
release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction,
whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of
justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts
and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However, evi-
dence of a conviction more than 10 years old as calculated herein, is not admis-
sible unless the proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written
notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair
opportunity to contest the use of such evidence.
29. See, e.g., Holt v. State, 347 So. 2d 536 (Ala. 1976); Pine v. Vigil, 28 Colo. App.
601, 480 P.2d 868 (1970); Grand Forks Bldg. & Dev. Co. v. Implement Dealers Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 75 N.D. 618, 31 N.W.2d 495 (1948); Commonwealth v. Calderbank, 161 Pa.
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Plyler,s0 the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that a witness'
prior consistent statement was admissible to prove the truth of
the matter asserted, despite the declarant's lack of first-hand
knowledge or observation of the fact asserted, because the de-
clarant was present at trial and available for cross-examina-
tion.31 This ruling, places South Carolina in a very small minor-
ity of jurisdictions.
In Plyler, defendant was charged with the murder of his for-
mer wife's sister. During the trial, defendant's former wife testi-
fied that she and the decedent were conversing by telephone
when the decedent interrupted the conversation to answer a
knock at the door. The witness then testified that she recognized
her former husband's voice over the telephone, related the sub-
stance of his conversation with the decedent, and stated that she
heard several gunshots that caused her to drop the receiver and
exclaim, "Harry (referring to defendant) just shot Linda. 3 2 De-
fendant was convicted of murder" and appealed the verdict,
contending that evidence of both the substance of his alleged
conversation with the decedent and the witness' prior consistent
statement, "Harry just shot Linda," were inadmissible as
hearsay.
34
The supreme court affirmed the conviction, explaining first
that the witness' testimony to the substance of defendant's con-
versation with the decedent was not subject to hearsay objection
because it was offered to place defendant at the scene of the
crime rather than to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 5
The court then disposed of defendant's contention that the wit-
ness' prior consistent statement was inadmissible. Observing
State v. Spadafore, 220 S.E.2d 655 (W. Va. 1975); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 245. In
Bottoms, the South Carolina Supreme Court adopted the following statement of the rule:
The general rule is almost universally recognized that evidence of extrajudicial
statements made by a witness who is not a party and whose declarations are
not binding as admissions is admissible only to impeach or discredit the wit-
ness, and is not competent as substantive evidence of the facts to which the
statements relate.
260 S.C. at 193, 195 S.E.2d at 118 (quoting Annot., 133 A.L.R. 1454, 1455 (1941)).
30. - S.C. -, 270 S.E.2d 126 (1980).
31. Id. at -, 270 S.E.2d at 128.
32. Record, vol. 1, at 24-25. Defendants did not challenge the particular words used.
Id.
33. Id at 2A.
34. Brief for Appellant at 1-8, 13-16.
35, - S.C. at -, 270 S.E.2d at 127.
[Vol. 33
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that "such an admission [was] technically in violation of the
traditional hearsay rule," the court nevertheless held the evi-
dence admissible and explained that
[b]ecause the declarant of the out-of-court assertions testified,
the truth of the statements were not dependent on the credi-
bility of individuals not present in the courtroom. Since the
declarant was subjected to cross-examination, which is the very
objective of the hearsay rule, exclusion of relevant evidence
serve[d] no purpose.36
To support this conclusion, the court cited its decision in
State v. Huggins1 and a decision by the Supreme Court of Indi-
ana, State v. Patterson.s In Huggins, a police officer was per-
mitted to testify to statements made by a confidential informant
that had resulted in the defendant's arrest. According to the
court, "[w]hether this testimony [was] hearsay or not [was] un-
important, since the informant later testified at trial. 3 9 In Pat-
terson, prior sworn statements of two witnesses were admitted
at trial for the purpose of impeachment, but the jury was not
instructed to limit the use of the evidence to that purpose.
Without considering the impeachment issue, the Indiana Su-
preme Court ruled that, in light of the relevance of the evidence
and the availability of the witnesses for cross-examination at
36. Id. at , 270 S.E.2d at 128 (citing Patterson v. State, 263 Ind. 55, 324 N.E.2d
482 (1975); State v. Huggins, - S.C. _ 269 S.E.2d 334 (1980)). Although both defen-
dant and the prosecution based their arguments concerning the admissibility of the prior
statement on the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule, Brief of Appellant at 13-16;
Brief for Respondent at 1-5, the court did not discuss this issue. "In order to qualify as
part of the res gestae, a statement must be substantially contemporaneous with the liti-
gated transaction and be the spontaneous utterance of the mind while under the active,
immediate influence of the event." State v. Blackburn, 271 S.C. 324, 327, 247 S.E.2d 334,
336 (1978) (citations omitted). In Bagwell v. McLellan Stores Co., 216 S.C. 207, 57
S.E.2d 257 (1949), however, the court ruled that, to fall within the res gestae exception, a
"declaration must explain, elucidate, or in some way characterize that event" and ex-
plained further that "the purpose of permitting the introduction of this class of evidence
is to prove facts not opinions." 216 S.C. at 217, 57 S.E.2d at 262 (citations omitted).
Because the prior statement in Plyler arguably is not a factual statement, it may not fall
within the res gestae exception. The exception has been criticized, and the court's failure
to discuss it may signal a retreat from the application of the exception. See generally
Hutchins & Schlesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence, 28 COLUM. L. Rzv.
342, 347 (1928). For further discussion of the criticism of the res gestae exception, see
Evidence, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 31 S.C.L. REV. 73, 73 n.2 (1979).
37. - S.C. -, 269 S.E.2d 334 (1980).
38. 263 Ind. 55, 324 N.E.2d 482 (1975).
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trial, "there was no reason to reject the [out of court] statements
as substantive evidence, simply because they had been made at
a time when witnesses were not subject to cross-examination.
'40
Plyler is troublesome both because of the authority on
which the court relied and the potential scope of its holding.
The court's reliance on Huggins seems misplaced. In Huggins,
the court did not rule that a prior statement was admissible be-
cause the declarant testified at trial but merely ruled that a de-
termination of whether or not the statement constituted hearsay
was unimportant. The court further concluded that later testi-
mony rendered admission of the prior statement harmless.4 1 Im-
plicit in Huggins, therefore, is the recognition that admission of
the prior consistent statement may have been error, albeit harm-
less. Patterson, the only other authority cited in Plyler to justify
the admissibility of the prior statement, has been called into
question in the state of its origin. Although Indiana has followed
Patterson in subsequent decisions,43 the Indiana Supreme Court
recently stated that "the rule drawn from Patterson may well be
in need of reconsideration."'
4
4
The hearsay rule ordinarily prohibits the admission of a wit-
ness' prior statements,' 5 but two exceptions to the rule are rec-
ognized. First, a prior statement, inconsistent with testimony
given by a witness in court, is admissible during cross-examina-
tion of the witness to attack his credibility.4" Second, a prior
statement, consistent with testimony given in court, is admissi-
ble during cross-examination of the witness to rehabilitate his
credibility by rebutting a charge of recent fabrication. 7 In each
40. 263 Ind. at 58, 324 N.E.2d at 484.
41. - S.C. at -, 269 S.E.2d at 335.
42. See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
43. E.g., Smith v. State, - Ind. .. _, 386 N.E.2d 1137 (1980) (expressly refusing to
overrule Patterson); Franklin v. State, - Ind. _, 386 N.E.2d 668 (1979); Taggard v.
State, - Ind. -, 382 N.E.2d 916 (1978); Flewallen v. State, 276 Ind. 90, 368 N.E.2d
239 (1977).
44. Samuels v. State, 267 Ind. 676, 678, 372 N.E.2d 1186, 1187 (1978) (Patterson
rule not intended to admit out-of-court statements that are mere substitutes for availa-
ble in-court testimony).
45. See note 29 supra.
46. People v. Gant, 58 Ill. 2d 778, 317 N.E.2d 564 (1974); State v. Lane, 302 So. 2d
880 (La. 1974); State v. Hudson, 325 A.2d 56 (Me. 1974); State v. Marchand, 31 N.J. 223,
156 A.2d 245 (1959); Mays v. Mays, 267 S.C. 490, 229 S.E.2d 725 (1976). See Evidence,
Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 27 S.C.L. REv. 467, 470 (1975).
47. E.g., Rease v. United States, 403 A.2d 322 (D.C. App. 1979); Openshaw v. Ad-
[Vol. 33
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case, the hearsay rule prevents use of the prior statement for
substantive proof.4 8 Although limitation of the use of prior state-
ments has been criticized,' 9 most attempts to modify the rule
have focused on broadening the application of the two excep-
tions.5o The Federal Rules of Evidence employ a different ap-
proach to substantive use of prior statements; the Rules do not
categorize evidence within the two common-law exceptions as
hearsay as long as certain formal requirements have been met.51
Admissibility of prior statements on direct examination, which
must be distinguished from the traditional exceptions for admis-
sibility on cross-examination, appears limited to a small minor-
ity of jurisdictions.52
aems, 92 Idaho 488, 445 P.2d 663 (1968); People v. Clark, 52 Ill. 2d 374, 288 N.E.2d 363
(1972); Commonwealth v. Zukowski, 370 Mass. 23, 345 N.E.2d 690 (1976); State v. King,
115 N.J. Super. 140, 278 A.2d 504 (1971); State v. Rhinehart, 70 Wash. 2d 649, 424 P.2d
906, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 832 (1967); Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 909, 913 (1961). See McMil-
lan v. Ridges, 229 S.C. 76, 91 S.E.2d 883 (1956).
48. See note 29 supra.
49. Dean Wigmore challenged the limitations of the orthodox hearsay rule as fol-
lows: "[T]he witness is present and subject to cross-examination. There is ample oppor-
tunity to test him as to the basis for his former statement. The whole purpose of the
hearsay rule has already been satisfied." 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1018 at 996 n.2.
50. The California Code of Evidence permits substantive use of prior consistent
statements that are admissible for other purposes on cross-examination. CAL. Evw. CODE
§§ 791, 1236 (West 1966).
51. FED. R. Evw. 801(d)(1) provides, in pertinent part, that a statement is not hear-
say if
[t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examma-
tion concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent with his
testimony, and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a
trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition, or (B) consistent with his
testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of
recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or (C) one of identification
of a person made after perceiving him ....
52. Included with South Carolina in this small minority are Illinois, Indiana, Kan-
sas, and North Carolina. 54 I11. App. 3d 312, 368 N.E.2d 608 (1977); Patterson v. State,
263 Ind. 55, 324 N.E.2d 482 (1975); State v. Satterfield, 27 N.C. App. 270, 218 S.E.2d 504
(1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(a)(1976).
The Kansas Legislature has codified a hearsay exception similar to the common law
rule in Indiana. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(a) (1976) provides that a previous statement is
admissible if it is "[a] statement previously made by a person who is present at the
hearing and available for cross-examination with respect to the statement and its subject
matter, provided the statement would be admissible if made by a declarant while testify-
ing as a witness." The statute substantially adopts MODEL CODE OF EvIDENCE rule 503(b)
(1942). See, e.g., State v. Clark, 222 Kan. 65, 563 P.2d 1028 (1977); State v. Taylor, 217
Kan. 706, 538 P.2d 1375 (1975). The now superseded 1953 version of the UNoRm RuLEs
OF EVIDENCE provided that evidence of a prior declaration, although hearsay, was admis-,
9
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A critic of the orthodox hearsay rule has characterized it as
a rule against unreliable evidence rather than against evidence
not susceptible of cross-examination. 53 The decision of the South
Carolina Supreme Court in Plyler firmly supports this proposi-
tion. It is uncertain, however, whether the court fully intended
to recast the hearsay rule as a rule that proscribes substantive
use of out-of-court statements only when the declarant is not
available for cross-examination. The Indiana experience suggests
a need for further definition by the South Carolina Supreme
Court of the scope of admissibility of a witness' prior
statements.
John A. Sowards
sible if the declarant was present at trial and subject to cross-examination. UNIFORM
RULES OF EVIDENCE 63(1) (1953). This approach was abandoned by UNIFORM RULE OF
EVIDENCE 801(d)(1)(1974), which closely parallels FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(1).
For a discussion of Patterson, see notes 40, 43 & 44 and accompanying text supra.
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